Earlier this year, a senior Pentagon official met with a vendor far down the supply chain of a top U.S. missile maker for an urgent conversation. The subject: rayon.
The material in question was not the breezy fabric of a Hawaiian shirt. The Pentagon was focused on a carbonized version capable of withstanding temperatures in the thousands of degrees, critical for making high-end Patriot interceptors sought after around the world for missile defense. Only one rayon product of this kind is approved for use in the most advanced Patriot missiles, and it comes from the Kansas factory of a single supplier, Park Aerospace. With Patriot stockpiles shrinking, the Pentagon official pushed Park for more rayon to help ramp up missile production. It soon became clear the company’s hands were tied.
The problem lay not in Kansas but thousands of miles across the Atlantic, near the vineyards of Bordeaux in France. That is where Park’s supplier, ArianeGroup, a maker of space rockets and ballistic missiles, produces the carbonized rayon fabric and ships it to Park for further processing. ArianeGroup had been clear that supply was limited. Park’s chief executive, Brian Shore, was certain pressure would not work with Ariane: “They’re a French company. They can’t be bullied. They’ll just shut down on you.”
The struggle to find enough rayon is emblematic of the challenges the U.S. faces in quickly surging production of critical munitions. Supply chains are riddled with chokepoints: one or two components, made by suppliers several levels down, can gum up the works, and those products often come from outside the U.S. with few or no ready American alternatives. Overhauling this fragile industrial base to achieve record production rates is a herculean task, hundreds of subcontractors ramping up in unison, factories expanded or built from scratch, alternative materials put through long, costly qualification testing.
The hose was once bigger. After the Soviet Union collapsed, U.S. policymakers sought a “peace dividend,” and over the following quarter-century the top tier of American aerospace and defense companies consolidated from 51 to just five primary contractors. Their supplier networks shrank with them: in the decade preceding a 2022 Pentagon report, the number of small businesses in the U.S. defense industrial base shrank by 40 percent. Data from March shows more than 70 percent of second-tier suppliers for the newest Patriot missiles, the PAC-3, also supply THAAD, another interceptor the U.S. has expended and wants in large quantities; the overlap is even more acute in the third tier. A failure at one supplier, a natural disaster, a strike, a bankruptcy, could cascade across a number of weapons.
The Pentagon is now scrambling to reverse the drawdown. It has signed a seven-year deal with Lockheed Martin, which makes the most advanced Patriot missile, and another with L3Harris, which supplies the solid rocket motors, to accelerate production, and it is reaching out directly to third- and fourth-tier suppliers to ease hidden bottlenecks. The Pentagon says it is “continually working on supply chain resilience and qualifying new suppliers.” L3Harris said it is confident it will maintain the materials needed “through at least the end of our 7-year framework agreement,” and that it is on target to qualify an additional source of rayon, without saying how long that would take.
The missile itself is a demanding machine. The PAC-3 is a hit-to-kill interceptor: it slams into an incoming ballistic missile to destroy it. By end-July, the U.S. had burned through its already-stretched inventory, leaving it roughly 65 percent smaller than before the Iran war began in February, according to estimates by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Each latest-model PAC-3 MSE costs about $4 million, takes roughly two years and many hundreds of components to make. Lockheed builds the interceptor but relies on Boeing for the seekers in its nose and on L3Harris’s dual-pulse solid rocket motor for range.
Rayon for the PAC-3 MSE begins as fiber strands at a factory in the Czech Republic owned by a Thailand-based chemicals conglomerate. The yarn travels to France to be woven; ArianeGroup, a joint venture of Airbus and Safran, carbonizes it near Bordeaux and sells the blackened rolls it calls Raycarb to Park, its lone North American distributor. Park coats the material with a custom resin in a temperature-controlled facility in Newton, Kansas, and sends it to L3Harris, which layers it inside the nozzles of solid rocket motors bound for Lockheed’s Patriot factory. Even a tiny flaw in a solid rocket motor can send an interceptor off course, so every component must pass rigorous qualification. “There’s a lot of testing that’s involved,” Shore said. “You could go down the path for two years, everything’s looking good, then at the last test it fails, and now you’re back to the drawing board.”
Rocket-grade rayon has a long history. Researchers discovered in 1958 that rayon, slowly baked in a vacuum, becomes a carbon fiber that resists extreme heat, protecting a motor as fuel burns above 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit. For most of the Cold War, the sole North American producer was a Virginia textile factory shut down in 1989 for discharging dangerous chemicals into the Shenandoah River; its Tennessee successor wound down production in 1998. With the stockpile dwindling in the mid-2000s, the Pentagon looked abroad: a product from France’s Snecma, later part of ArianeGroup, matched or beat the American rayon in tests, and a resin-coated version was qualified for Patriot nozzles in 2005.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine sent demand surging, and the Iran war drained inventories further. To show commitment, the Pentagon shifted to multiyear contracts and awarded Lockheed a deal to more than triple PAC-3 MSE production to about 2,000 a year by the end of 2030. But the clock will not wait. Park has advanced $5 million to help fund a new production line at Ariane’s French factory, expected to start rolling out rayon in 2028, nowhere near enough to satiate U.S. demand. Ariane has also signed a preliminary agreement to build a U.S. factory, backed by a promised $25 million advance from Park, to open around 2030 if all goes to plan. “The big problem is that nobody wants to wait 3½ years,” Shore said. The other major European source, Germany’s Enka, is not qualified for the PAC-3 MSE, and its business took a severe hit after the pandemic; a Pentagon bulk buy of more than 470,000 pounds of fabric over two years postponed its plant closure, but “as it sits now, there’s an ending sometime in ’28,” its U.S. importer says. Meanwhile Park and L3Harris are testing Enka and other rayon sources as “gap fillers” until Ariane’s U.S. factory opens, and nothing has crossed the finish line. “Even with these gap fillers,” Shore said, “it’s going to be a challenge.”
Background: Inside a solid rocket motor’s nozzle, gases pass at thousands of degrees; the carbonized rayon layer acts as an ablative shield, burning away gradually so the motor does not melt. Without this fabric, the production line for America’s most important missile-defense interceptor, and its allies’, stops.
Analysis: This report is the war of attrition in mirror image. In the field, blockade and air defense keep the regime under pressure; in the factories, a single roll of French fabric can set the rate of fire. Washington has absorbed the lesson, answering with seven-year contracts and a plan to triple PAC-3 output, but until the new lines open in 2028 and 2030, every month of war means a thinner inventory. The message for Tehran is equally clear: time no longer works in the regime’s favor, because America’s industrial machine is only now warming up.
Source: Wall Street Journal
