Center for Peace and War Studies مرکز مطالعات صلح و جنگ

Russia, Europe & NATO

How Russia Is Preparing the Islamic Republic for the Next Escalation

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Cautious optimism has emerged this week about de-escalation in the U.S. and Israeli war with the Islamic Republic. Qatari and Pakistani mediators have stepped up efforts to close an agreement between the warring parties, after a massive military buildup in the region raised fears of a fresh kinetic phase of the conflict.

Several factors have played a role in U.S. President Donald Trump’s current decision to hold off on fresh attacks. One of them is certainly the Islamic Republic’s ability to see an attack coming and retaliate precisely — an ability likely made possible by Russia’s sharing of military-grade geographic and signals intelligence.

A research project tracked the paths of Russian spy satellites for eight months and identified at least 20 Russian spacecraft of the Cosmos-2600 series, 18 of them trackable. The group comprises Russia’s newest and most maneuverable military reconnaissance satellites, capable of military mapping reconnaissance of facilities and terrain, optical imaging, radar observation and signals-intelligence collection, including radar emissions and military communications activity.

The tracked satellites cover a region running from Syria, Lebanon and Israel to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and the Islamic Republic, including Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz. They orbit the Earth roughly every 95 minutes and, depending on viewing geometry, make about three to four relevant regional passes a day.

The project’s researcher observed that selected maneuverable satellites were repositioned to pass directly or nearly directly over military and infrastructure targets in the region. The whole constellation was not moved, only specific spacecraft — a step that improved the timing and quality of coverage over relevant targets.

The Russian satellites could be seen passing over targets before they were struck and then again afterward, probably for damage assessment. The same pattern was repeated many times before and after the Islamic Republic’s attacks.

The author concludes that, given the precision with which the Islamic Republic was able to strike American and Persian Gulf military and civilian targets, Russia provided the geographic intelligence the Islamic Republic’s military needed to carry out those attacks.

America’s problem is that such intelligence capability can be used not only for target selection but also to monitor a military buildup. When American aircraft are repositioned, naval forces redistributed and military infrastructure in the region reinforced, Russian satellites can provide a clear picture of those movements and of the intensity of military communications — including where the communications come from, when activity increases and how the pattern changes.

Some spy satellites may also be able to listen in on military communications, though it is unlikely they can intercept every message.

The collected intelligence can be given to the Islamic Republic’s intelligence services to help its leaders protect their forces, keep their command system functioning and prepare their response before a battle begins. The Islamic Republic’s access to Russian satellite data therefore complicates American efforts to combine offensive readiness with protection against retaliation.

Russia’s access also gives the Islamic Republic early-warning capability for attacks from outside the region. During Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025, B-2 bombers flew from American soil to strike the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities. Tehran knows another such attack on deeply buried facilities is possible and can use Russian satellite capability to watch for its early signs.

Beyond preparing to receive an attack, the author says, access to Russian satellite intelligence likely plays a central role in preparing retaliation in the region. By the Islamic Republic leaders’ own warnings, the danger extends to refineries, export terminals, desalination plants and power stations.

By providing such space-intelligence capability to the Islamic Republic, Moscow preserves significant leverage: it can strengthen or restrain Tehran by controlling the intelligence access, without entering the conflict directly.

Russia’s willingness to share satellite data will inevitably affect future American operations. The U.S. military must now assume that major force movements, military buildups and electronic activity can be observed and quickly passed to the enemy. That reduces operational surprise and demands greater dispersion, emissions control and rapid repositioning.

The implications go beyond this war. Last month a Russian Cosmos-series satellite approached a Finnish commercial satellite, probably rehearsing an attack. The incident shows the conflict on the ground can spread to space and disrupt civilian and military satellite infrastructure.

Background: “Cosmos” is the generic designation Russia has used for its military satellites since the Soviet era, with the series numbers used to conceal each spacecraft’s real mission. Satellite-intelligence sharing between Russia and the Islamic Republic is part of the two countries’ deepening military cooperation since the Ukraine war; in exchange for the drones and missiles it received from Tehran, Moscow has given the regime technology and intelligence. This is an analytical article, and its claims are the author’s assessment.

Analysis: The real value of this report lies in the confession embedded in it: without Moscow’s borrowed eyes, the Islamic Republic can neither strike precisely nor foresee an attack. But the same lever is also a chain; whenever Moscow wishes, it can shut off the intelligence tap and leave Tehran blind. For Washington the operational lesson is clear — dispersion, electronic silence and deception — and the strategic lesson is clearer still: the war with the regime is no longer a war with Tehran alone, but with a network in which Moscow and Beijing also sit, and the answer must be designed at that scale.

Source: Al Jazeera