The man whose congressional testimony five years ago led to what is called the “Davidson Window” — for China to be able to launch a credible invasion of Taiwan by 2027 — now, as that date approaches, offers insights into what he thinks now.
Philip Davidson — the admiral who at the time led U.S. forces in the Pacific — said on a podcast released on Friday that several developments since his retirement in 2021 could change his prediction. However, the former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command — now called Pacific Command, or PACOM — told the podcast “Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific?” that he still sees reasons for concern. In particular, he urged the United States to deliver military aid to Taiwan before an invasion, to better deter China from acting.
Davidson’s remarks came as China has steadily increased military exercises around Taiwan, which it regards as a breakaway province that it will one day bring back under its control.
Before turning to what Davidson told the podcasters, Ray Powell, founder and chief executive of the SeaLight Foundation, and Jim Caruso, a senior adviser at BowerGroupAsia, let us recall what Davidson told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 9, 2021.
“I worry that they’re accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order, which they’ve long said they want to do by 2050,” Davidson said of China. “I’m worried about them moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before that, and I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact in the next six years.”
The so-called “Davidson Window” assessment was backed two years later by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Bill Burns, then director of the CIA, stated: “President Xi has instructed the PLA, China’s military leadership, to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan.”
What Has Changed Since Then?
“At its heart, I hope I was wrong,” Davidson said of his congressional testimony. “If I was wrong, it means the things we recommended from Indo-Pacific Command, the things the United States government and other governments have done over the past seven years, have been effective. And a war has not happened.”
Davidson, who now serves on the board of defense contractor AV, explained: “I advocated, just in a military sense, for five sets of capabilities — investment guidelines that I thought were important to carry out. The United States needed to rethink its posture and force design in the region, in the Indo-Pacific — where we are, how we deployed, what we rotated, what the capabilities of those sets were. We also needed a more diverse and larger set of joint fires, meaning offensive fires, not just from the sea, but from the land and air domains.”
The admiral added: “You certainly see that being carried out right now, with deployments and missile deployments, with Marine formations, Army formations in the Philippines and along the first island chain. That has helped.”
In addition, Davidson noted that the United States “needed to improve our exercises, experiments and innovation in the region. We have deepened the relationship with Japan and Australia in the Keen exercise series over the past five years, in a way that was almost unheard of in my time, which I think is a profound improvement.”
The Keen Sword training exercise took place last month and saw “about 45,000 personnel from the Japan Self-Defense Forces, 11,000 members of the U.S. armed forces and forces from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the Philippines… participating alongside observers from the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom,” according to the U.S. Navy.
Davidson noted that Japan taking a more assertive security posture toward China is an enormous change from when he was commander.
“Japan has completely stepped forward; they reissued their national security strategy in December [2022], and a number of alliance announcements were made with us in January [2023],” he explained.
Davidson highlighted that the Japanese doubled their defense investment from 1 percent to 2 percent of GDP. Japan also “created space [and] cyber forces, established the cyber security principles and laws necessary to deepen our relationship in a classified way. And that is almost unknown to anyone in the United States. They completely redistributed and reset their ground formations and their air formations in the southwestern island chain, between Okinawa and along the Ryukyu chain.”
“Most importantly, they identified China as the strategic threat in the region,” Davidson offered. “And in the alliance announcement in January [2023] with us, they said our interests in this regard have converged.”
Davidson explained that Taiwan has also made some necessary improvements in its approach to its own defense since his retirement.
“You have to be encouraged by Taiwan’s actions since then,” he stated. “They extended the conscription timeline from just a few months to a year of service. They have done enormous work in their national emergency preparedness area.”
Davidson also credited Admiral Lee Hsi-min, Taiwan’s chief of the general staff from 2017 to 2019, with developing the Overall Defense Concept. Lee envisioned a mix of mines, unmanned aerial systems, unmanned surface vessels, unmanned underwater vehicles, manned coastal defense boats, short- and medium-range mobile ground-based precision munitions, precision-guided multiple rocket launcher systems, man-portable air defense systems, anti-armor rocket systems and electronic warfare measures to counter the People’s Liberation Army’s decisive advantages in aviation and naval assets and long-range fires.
“He said: ‘We really have to develop the kind of asymmetric capabilities that will help offset our lack of capacity relative to its relationship with the People’s Republic of China and make sure we have a strategic and operational design that can kill in the littoral zone and along the landing beaches and so on,'” Davidson noted. “They have gone after autonomy. They have gone after robotics and drones and sensing.”
However, as we have repeatedly noted, Taiwan is still far behind where it should be in many of these areas, but especially in unmanned systems.
In addition, Davidson said growing relations with the Philippines and Australia also help. Australia signed the Australia-United Kingdom-United States security partnership in September 2021, months after Davidson’s retirement. AUKUS calls for the United States and the United Kingdom to share nuclear submarine technology with Australia.
“So over the past six years since March 9, 2021, you have seen a lot of changes that I think have strengthened Western deterrence here, and I think it is important to pay attention to that,” Davidson stated.
What Still Needs to Change
Despite seeing the United States and its allies better prepared to defend against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Davidson said he is concerned that the United States is not moving fast enough to provide the promised military aid.
“I would like to see the $14 billion in [foreign military sales] committed to Taiwan transferred there in the next few months or a year,” Davidson stated.
Wellington Koo, Taiwan’s defense minister, said in September that approval of the package, which is a main point of contention with China, has stalled.
The Associated Press noted that the minister’s remarks “come as concerns grow that President Donald Trump could halt arms sales to Taiwan. China has pressed Washington to halt arms sales, most prominently during the May summit in Beijing between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The United States halted the $14 billion arms deal after that meeting.”
Reuters reported that the package “consists mainly of Patriot PAC-3 air defense missiles and NASAMS [National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System].”
However, another enormous factor beyond tensions with China is the U.S. supply of these air defense munitions, which has been dramatically affected by ongoing and recent Middle East conflicts. Donations to Ukraine have also eaten into U.S. stockpiles. The lack of sufficient stockpile depth is an issue The War Zone has repeatedly raised for years, and especially with regard to U.S. air and missile defenses.
Commitments for delivery to 20 other countries and insatiable overall global demand for interceptors due to multiple destabilizing events have put further pressure on the supply of U.S. interceptors. All of this also puts pressure on industry’s ability to provide sufficient capacity.
For example, according to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, current PAC-3 MSE production “is roughly at a baseline rate of 650 interceptors per year, with half of deliveries to the United States and the rest to allies and partners.” The Pentagon is trying to increase production. Under a contract with the Pentagon closed in January, Lockheed Martin committed to increasing annual Patriot production to 2,000 interceptors.
In addition to wanting the arms package moved forward, Davidson warned about China’s information warfare capabilities.
“One thing that has really stood out to me that was a problem, certainly when I was Indo-Pacific commander, but is now worse, is the information environment,” Davidson raised. “China is working to undermine democratic processes in Taiwan. They are working to undermine every American citizen’s trust in business leadership and political leadership and military leadership. They exploit accidents or difficulties someone might have to flood social media, and this is happening not just from China, but from Russia and Iran and independent actors elsewhere.”
“It is really dangerous,” the former commander stressed. “There have been estimates that bot activity and propaganda actors make up as much as 70 percent of the comments in social media threads here and there, and this is a much more difficult place to be.”
Davidson said the United States needs to strengthen its own information warfare capabilities.
“I think we have to put as much effort into [the information domain] as we have put into drones and autonomy and so on these days,” he stated.
Davidson did not address some other obvious issues regarding a possible Chinese seizure of Taiwan. The biggest of them would be whether the United States would actually respond militarily if a major Chinese exercise suddenly turned into an actual invasion operation. Would there even be enough time, and what about China’s anti-access capabilities, which could keep a large part of U.S. combat power away in the early stages of such a conflict? Would there even be domestic support for such an intervention operation, especially given that it would certainly be bloody and would certainly manifest itself here at home? Then, as we noted in this piece, there are many areas where Taiwan appears to be moving very slowly, while China’s military is growing on almost every front.
Nevertheless, it is good to hear from the man who unwittingly brought the “Davidson Window” into the world, now that the ominous window of vulnerability he predicted half a decade ago is opening.
Background: The “Davidson Window” is a term derived from Admiral Philip Davidson’s 2021 testimony to Congress, in which he said China might acquire the military capability needed to invade Taiwan by 2027; since then, this estimate has become one of the foundations of U.S. defense planning in the Pacific. The PAC-3 is also the most advanced interceptor of the Patriot missile defense system, which destroys ballistic missiles by direct impact, and global demand for it has risen sharply after recent wars.
Analysis: The Davidson window was never only a forecast of Chinese capability; it was an estimate of the readiness ratio between two sides in a specific year. Today two facts stand against each other. Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia genuinely are strengthening deterrence — but PAC-3 interceptor production is straining under global demand, and the $14 billion aid package for Taiwan sits stalled. The war with the Islamic Republic exposed that bottleneck in public: the West’s missile-defense magazines were drawn down at rates its production lines were never built to match. The fate of 2027 may be decided less in the Taiwan Strait than in the interceptor factories.
